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MOVING BEYOND CONSENT FOR CITIZEN 
SCIENCE IN BIG DATA HEALTH AND 
MEDICAL RESEARCH 
Anne S.Y. Cheung* 
ABSTRACT—Consent has been the cornerstone of the personal data 
privacy regime. This notion is premised on the liberal tenets of individual 
autonomy, freedom of choice, and rationality. The above concern is 
particularly pertinent to citizen science in health and medical research, in 
which the nature of research is often data intensive with serious implications 
for individual privacy and other interests. Although there is no standard 
definition for citizen science, it includes generally the gathering and 
volunteering of data by non-professionals, the participation of non-experts 
in analysis and scientific experimentation, and public input into research and 
projects. Consent from citizen scientists determines the responsibility and 
accountability of data users. Yet with the advancement of data mining and 
big data technologies, risks and harm of subsequent data use may not be 
known at the time of data collection. Progress of research often extends 
beyond the existing data. In other words, consent becomes problematic in 
citizen science in the big data era. The notion that one can fully specify the 
terms of participation through notice and consent has become a fallacy. 
Is consent still valid? Should it still be one of the critical criteria in 
citizen science health and medical research which is collaborative and 
contributory by nature? With a focus on the issue of consent and privacy 
protection, this study analyzes not only the traditional informed consent 
model but also the alternative models. Facing the challenges that big data 
and citizen science pose to personal data protection and privacy, this article 
explores the legal, social, and ethical concerns behind the concept of consent. 
It argues that we need to move beyond the consent paradigm and take into 
account the much broader context of harm and risk assessment, focusing on 
the values behind consent – autonomy, fairness and propriety in the name of 
research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consent has been the cornerstone of the personal data privacy regime.1 
It authorizes the collection, use, and processing of personal data. When it 
comes to health and medical research, consent is a prerequisite for the 
intervention in one’s body, the collection of bio-specimens, and the use of 
personal data.2 The doctrine of consent is premised on the liberal tenets of 
individual autonomy, dignity, and integrity, rooted in the fundamental 
respect to a person, and intertwined with the right to respect for privacy.3 
More importantly, consent is only meaningful if it is freely given (voluntary), 
specific, and informed.4 
The above concern is particularly pertinent to citizen science in health 
and medical research, in which the nature of research is often data-intensive 
and has serious implications for an individual’s privacy and other interests.5 
Although there is no standard definition for citizen science, the European 
Commission has highlighted its general features to be the gathering and 
volunteering of data by nonprofessionals and the participation of nonexperts 
in analysis and scientific experimentation, with public input into research 
and projects.6 Citizens become experimenters, stakeholders, purveyors of 
data, research participants, or even partners in the process.7 Consent from 
citizen scientists is indispensable as it is a constitutive element for 
participants’ self-determination and self-empowerment. Furthermore, 
consent from participants as data subjects determines the responsibility and 
 
 * Anne S.Y. Cheung, Professor of Law, the University of Hong Kong. An earlier version of this article 
was presented at the “Disciplining or Empowering the Citizenry Through Citizen Science” Conference, 
organized by the Institutum Iurisprudentiae Academia Sinica, Taiwan in December 2016. The author 
benefits from the valuable comments and suggestions of the participants. The author is grateful for the 
research assistance of Jason C.P. So and Michael M.K. Cheung. 
 1 See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD 
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/U9BZ-KHSB]. 
 2 MARCUS DÜWELL, BIOETHICS: METHODS, THEORIES, DOMAINS 193 (2013). 
 3 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 107 (7th ed., 
2012). 
 4 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent, WP187, 
at 34–35 (July 13, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2011/wp187_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/EJE8-9YGF]. 
 5 Opinion No. 29 of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the Europeon 
Comission: The Ethical Implications of New Health Technologies and Citizen Participation, at 20 (Oct. 
13, 2015) [hereinafter Opinion No. 29 of the EGE], http://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/opinion-
29_ege.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VDE-J5MY]. 
 6 Id. at 23. 
 7 Id. By citizens as “experimenters,” this refers to patients participating in various degrees in 
experimentation. Id. at 25. “Stakeholders” refers to patient expert groups. Id. “Purveyors of data” refers 
to citizens or patients sending data through digital devices, mobile devices, and other information 
communication technology. Id. 
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accountability of data users. Under orthodox understanding, consent should 
be given on a one-on-one basis, for a “single study at a single institution for 
a specific purpose.”8 
While this may sound sensible and reasonable, technology always 
produces new directions and challenges for research. With advances in 
information technology and data analytics, health and medical research have 
become data-intensive, global, and virtual.9 Biobanks and virtual research 
repositories are gaining prominence and significance.10 At the same time, the 
risk inherent in health and medical research and big data technology has 
often extended beyond the existing data. In addition, the use and transfer of 
data for other unforeseen purposes is often outside the control of the original 
research team. Plus, the risks and harm of subsequent data use may not be 
known at the time of data collection. Hence, consent becomes problematic 
because the traditional understanding of consent, that one can fully specify 
the terms of agreement in advance, becomes questionable in big data science 
and citizen science. 
We cannot help but ask: is consent still valid? Should it still be one of 
the critical criteria in citizen science health research which is collaborative 
and contributory by nature? While the big data challenge is not unique to 
citizen science, the inherent sensitivity of health and medical data 
exacerbates the problem, which calls for close scrutiny of the doctrine of 
consent. With a focus on citizen science in health and medical research, this 
study examines the doctrine of consent and its inadequacies. It then analyzes 
the alternative and adaptive models of consent: open, broad, dynamic, 
portable, and meta consent.11 Facing the challenges that big data and citizen 
science pose to personal data protection and privacy, this article explores the 
legal, social, and ethical concerns behind consent. It argues that navigating 
one’s way through different models of consent and the varied choices in 
consent forms can be a legal minefield. We need to move beyond the consent 
paradigm into a broader framework of accountability, taking into 
consideration harm and risk assessment. Ultimately, what lies behind 
consent are the entailing values of autonomy, fairness, and propriety in the 
name of research. 
 
 8 Bridget M. Kuehn, Groups Experiment with Digital Tools for Patient Consent, 310 JAMA 678, 
679 (2013). 
 9 BETTINA SCHMIETOW, Ethical Dimensions of Dynamic Consent in Data-Intense Biomedical 
Research—Paradigm Shift, or Red Herring?, in ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, 
RESEARCH ETHICS FORUM 197 (Daniel Strech & Marcel Mertz eds., 2016). 
 10 See generally Charles Auffray et al., Making Sense of Big Data in Health Research: Towards an 
EU Action Plan, 8 GENOME MED. (2016), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4919856/ 
[http://perma.cc/V45C-7EJ2]. 
 11 See infra Part IV. 
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II. CITIZEN SCIENCE AND BIG DATA HEALTH RESEARCH 
We begin our discussion by looking at the nature of citizen science. In 
the mid-1990s, Alan Irwin popularized and prompted the discussion on 
citizen science.12 Irwin examined the relationship between citizens and 
science, including science that assists citizens’ needs and concerns and 
science developed and enacted by citizens themselves.13 Irwin flagged up the 
need to face up to the challenges posed by risks in scientific research and 
sustainable development.14 
By the 21st century, citizen science has developed into different forms 
of participation by nonprofessional scientists, exhibiting various dimensions 
in the cooperation between professionals and nonprofessionals and opening 
up multiple levels of engagement in the health sector. At one end of the 
spectrum, there are citizen-led, patient-owned initiatives of sharing 
quantitative information, exchanging experiences on treatment, and 
searching for the right clinical trials on online platforms. Prominent 
examples include PatientsLikeMe,15 CureLauncher16 and CureTogether.17 At 
the other end of the spectrum, there is commercial or government-led 
research. For instance, Sage Bionetworks took advantage of smartphone-
based health technology to study the lifestyle of 17,000 Parkinson’s disease 
patients.18 It also paired up with Apple ResearchKit in 2015 to study the 
quality of life of breast cancer survivors.19 In the same year, President Obama 
announced the nationwide $215 million Precision Medicine Initiative to 
build a large-scale research enterprise between public and private sectors, 
calling for one million volunteers to contribute their health data so as to 
extend precision medicine to all diseases.20 In between the two models, there 
 
 12 Barbara Prainsack, Understanding Participation: The “Citizen Science” of Genetics, in GENETICS 
AS SOCIAL PRACTICE: TRANSDISCIPLINARY VIEWS ON SCIENCE AND CULTURE 147 (Barbara Prainsack et 
al. eds., 2014). 
 13 ALAN IRWIN, CITIZEN SCIENCE: A STUDY OF PEOPLE, EXPERTISE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT xi (1995). 
 14 Id. at x. Irwin’s case study was mainly on environmental development. Id. at xii. 
 15 PATIENTSLIKEME, https://www.patientslikeme.com (last visited May 9, 2018). 
 16 CURELAUNCHER, http://curelauncher.com [https://web.archive.org/web/20180103112551/
http://www.curelauncher.com/] (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
 17 CURETOGETHER, http://curetogether.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
 18 Max Little, Crowdsourced Parkinson’s Research: Engaging People, Opening Up Science, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-network-
blog/2014/apr/07/parkinsons-disease-research-science-health. 
 19 Aditi Pai, Apple’s ResearchKit Now Available to Medical Researchers, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Apr. 
14, 2015), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/42370/apples-researchkit-now-available-to-medical-
researchers. 
 20 The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision 
Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
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is a third catering to joint collaboration between citizens and health 
professionals in creating knowledge. A prominent example includes the 
Sarroch Bioteca Foundation founded in 2012 in pursuit of a “citizen 
veillance on health” project in Italy.21 The project was launched by the 
Sarroch municipality in 2006 to gather biological samples donated by 
citizens to monitor genetic changes as health indicators in relation to the 
environment.22 All citizens of the municipality could become members of the 
project.23 The aim was to use science to inform both health regulations and 
institutional implementation policy.24 The Sarroch example can be seen as a 
joint effort for collective governance and a model for democratic health 
choice.25 
Regardless of the level of citizen involvement, participation issues 
related to the data privacy and security of research subjects (or the form of 
cooperation in the above models as contractual, contributory, collaborative, 
co-creative, or collegial26) will be triggered whenever citizens have 
contributed their data or bio-specimens to the projects. Following the new 
wave of citizen science research in big data is a whole new set of legal and 
ethical concerns. First, we are witnessing an unprecedented scale of online 
crowdsourcing, with researchers pooling data together using big data capture 
strategies and data analytics.27 As the progression of research often extends 
beyond the existing data, big data technology use and the transfer of data for 




 21 Mariachiara Tallacchini, Philip Boucher & Susana Nascimento, European Comm’n, Joint Res. 
Center Sci. and Policy Reports, Emerging ICT for Citizens’ Veillance, at 30, EUR 26809 EN (2014), 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC90334/civ%20-%20final%20draft.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L2UD-VAWH]. 
 22 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 28. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Jennifer L. Shirk et al., Public Participation in Scientific Research: A Framework for Deliberate 
Design, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC. 29 (2012), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss2/art29/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2018). The typology of the five project models is formulated by Shirk and her colleagues. 
Contractual projects refer to communities asking professional researchers to conduct a specific 
investigation and report. Id. Contributory projects refer to those designed by scientists, with citizens 
contributing data. Id. Collaborative projects are similar to contributory project except with citizens 
helping to refine project design, analyze data, or disseminate findings. Id. Co-created projects are jointly 
designed by scientists and citizens, in which some citizens are actively involved in most or all aspects of 
the research process. Id. Lastly, collegial contributions refer to non-credential individuals conducting 
research independently with varying degrees of expected recognition by professional scientists. Id. 
 27 Mark A. Rothstein, John T. Wilbanks & Kyle B. Brothers, Citizen Science on Your Smartphone: 
An ELSI Research Agenda, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 897, 897 (2015). 
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team.28 Second, despite the promise of data de-identification, third parties 
can match data sets to reidentify individuals.29 Third, with the advancement 
of data mining and big data technologies, the risks and harm associated with 
subsequent data use may not be known at the time of data collection and use. 
For instance, large-scale harvesting of health data can reveal unnoticed 
correlations between lifestyle and medical conditions of individuals. These 
correlations are important information for insurance companies.30 The fear is 
that insurance companies may use big data analytics to draw conclusions on 
consumers’ health care use and thus increase premiums in unprecedented 
ways.31 In other words, consent becomes problematic in health and medical 
research, especially in the big data era. The notion that one can fully disclose 
and specify the terms of notice and consent at the outset has become illusory. 
III. RETHINKING CONSENT 
Consent has been a cardinal doctrine in clinical treatment and research. 
It is premised on the respect for individual autonomy, which embodies the 
principle of self-rule that is free from “controlling interference by others and 
limitations that prevent meaningful choice.” 32 It is enshrined in numerous 
international treaties, legal guidelines, and codes.33 Namely, on the 
protection of human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) stipulates that “free consent” is a prerequisite for medical 
and scientific experimentation.34 On personal data, the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) state that “explicit consent” is 
 
 28 See Bartha Maria Knoppers & Adrian Mark Thorogood, Ethics and Big Data in Health, 4 
CURRENT OPINION IN SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 53, 54 (2017); UNESCO, Report of the IBC on Big Data and 
Health, at 11–12 (2017), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002487/248724E.pdf. 
 29 Lataya Sweeney, Weaving Technology and Policy Together to Maintain Confidentiality, 25(2&3) 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 98, 98 (1997). 
 30 Aaron Stanley, Tech Companies See Market Opportunity in Healthcare Innovation, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (May 5, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/709aa784-efd4-11e4-ab73-00144feab7de. 
 31 With big data analytics, insurance companies can collect large amounts of personalized data about 
individuals for evaluating individual habits and lifestyles to create new predictive and risk models. Cathy 
O’Neil, Big Data Is Coming to Take Your Health Insurance, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-04/big-data-is-coming-to-take-your-health-
insurance. Different jurisdictions have laws that prohibit the use of genetic data in health insurance. 
Knoppers & Thorogood, supra note 28, at 53–54. 
 32 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 101. 
 33 For an historical overview, see Benjamin M. Meier, International Protection of Persons 
Undergoing Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L. 
L. 513 514–33 (2002). For further comparison of global guidelines on consent and informed consent, see 
Zulfiqar A. Bhutta, Beyond Informed Consent, 82 BULL. WHO 771, 771–77 (2004). 
 34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”). 
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necessary for the processing of genetic, biometric, and health data.35 Under 
article 4 of the GDPR, consent means “any freely given, specific, informed 
and unambiguous indication of the data subject” by a clear affirmative action 
signifying agreement to the processing of personal data. On experiments 
done by physicians, the Nuremberg Code sets the standards to which 
physicians must conform when carrying out experiments on human subjects, 
including obtaining consent and ascertaining competence from human 
subjects in experiments.36 On medical research, the World Medical 
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki calls for “informed consent, preferably 
in writing” from physicians.37 Again, on biomedicine research, the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine calls for “free and informed” 
consent.38 The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects insists that investigators must obtain the 
“voluntary informed consent of the prospective subject. . . . Waiver of 
informed consent is to be regarded as uncommon and exceptional, and must 
in all cases be approved by an ethical review committee.”39 On research 
involving human subjects in general, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 
specifies that informed consent from participants in research must involve 
discussion of the nature of the involved procedure, its risks and benefits, and 
alternative treatments available.40 Finally, participants must also give free 
assent.41 
Regardless of whether it is free, explicit, informed, and voluntary, the 
four essential elements of valid consent are comprehension or understanding, 
 
 35 Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 9, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 38 [hereinafter GDPR], http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN. In addition to article 
9, article 7 requires that the request for data subjects’ consent must be clearly distinguishable, intelligible, 
easily accessible, and expressed in clear and plain language. See id. at art. 7. The GDPR came into force 
on May 25, 2018. See id. at art. 99. 
 36 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 (1949) (stating that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential . . . [and includes] legal capacity . . . free power of choice . . . sufficient knowledge 
and comprehension of the [nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment] . . . to make an understanding 
and enlightened decision.”). 
 37 WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human 
Subjects, World Med. Ass’n (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-
helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/. The declaration was 
promulgated in 1964 and revised nine times since. Id. 
 38 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine art. 5, opened 
for signature Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No. 164 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1999). 
 39 COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 22 (2002). 
 40 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2017). 
 41 Id. 
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voluntary participation, competence, and disclosure.42 While the first three 
refer to the duty of doctors or researchers to obtain the voluntary agreement 
of human subjects before participation, the last one refers to their duty to 
disclose adequate information to the subjects.43 Both limbs are integrated 
requirements of consent as a single legal and moral doctrine.44 Seemingly, 
the above frameworks in international and national law, codes, and 
guidelines have provided the necessary and sufficient legal basis for 
informed consent and for the use of one’s data or bio-specimens. But how 
detailed descriptions of the research should be and how much disclosure 
would be required as adequate remains controversial. 
In the context of citizen science in health and medical research, 
participants must face the additional uncertainty and unpredictability of 
research progress. For example, in the 1980s, a group of Canavan disease-
affected families developed a disease registry and tissue bank to encourage 
research in the area.45 They provided tissue for research on the disease and 
aided in the identification of other affected families.46 With three nonprofit 
organizations, they developed a confidential database and Canavan disease 
registry, attracting financial sponsorship.47 However, when one of the chosen 
physician-researchers decided to isolate and patent the Canavan gene 
sequence and develop genetic screening tests for it, the families sued the 
researcher and his institution.48 The bitter legal battle ended only in half-
victory. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims, including lack of informed 
consent, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment of the patent, and 
misappropriation of trade secrets.49 Nevertheless, the court upheld the claim 
of unjust enrichment made by the tissue donors on the grounds that “the facts 
 
 42 Gopal Sreenivasan, Does Informed Consent to Research Require Comprehension?, 362 LANCET 
2016, 2016 (2003). 
 43 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. 
 44 Id. 
 45 About Canavan Disease, CANAVAN FOUNDATION, http://www.canavanfoundation.org/
about_canavan_disease (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). Canavan disease is a progressive, fatal neurological 
disorder that begins in infancy. Id. It is caused by an inherited genetic abnormality resulting in improper 
transmission of nerve signals. Id.; see Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health 
Data Commons and the Transformation of Citizen Science, 4 Am. J.L. & Med. 651, 652 (2016) 
(discussing the dispute). 
 46 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 
2003). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 1067–68. 
 49 Id. at 1077. 
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paint a picture of a continued research collaboration that involved Plaintiffs 
also investing time and significant resources.”50 
In more recent times, another notorious example is the 23andMe 
project. It became known in late 2007 as a company offering genetic testing 
at a very low price of $299, giving out saliva collection kits and asking for 
saliva samples.51 The testing was perceived as a “fun way” to learn about 
one’s genetics.52 In 2008, 23andMe added a new research feature named 
23andWe which played up citizen science rhetoric and community-driven 
research, emphasizing strong participatory features.53 It invited customers 
and participants to vote on of a list of diseases which the company promised 
it would then prioritize in its research.54 In exchange, the customers and 
participants were asked to disclose details about their lifestyles and other 
relevant information for research purposes.55 By that time, the company had 
offered free saliva collection kits to people who had been diagnosed with the 
types of diseases that the company wanted to focus on and research.56 
Additionally, the company lowered the price of saliva collection kit to $99.57 
By 2012, 23andMe had about 150,000 users.58 The business was operating 
as a commercial company drawing heavily on the contributions of citizen 
science participants . 
Some patients and members of patient support groups joined 23andMe 
under the impression that they were contributing their genetic and personal 
data for the development of treatment and long-term research.59 However, 
they soon woke up to reality when the company filed a number of patent 
applications in 2012.60 People realized that 23andMe was sharing aggregate 
data about its customers and participants with third parties, and that Google 
 
 50 Id. at 1072–73. 
 51 Charles Seife, 23andMe Is Terrifying, but Not for the Reasons the FDA Thinks, SCI. AM. (Nov. 
27, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/23andme-is-terrifying-but-not-for-the-reasons-
the-fda-thinks/ [https://perma.cc/W6KT-W26P]. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156; see also Dan Vorhaus, Genomic Research Goes DTC, ROBINSON 
BRADSHAW HINSON GENOMICS L. REP. (July 9, 2009), https://www.genomicslawreport.com/
index.php/2009/07/09/genomic-research-goes-dtc/ [https://perma.cc/22F5-4SYD]. 
 54 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Seife, supra note 51. 
 58 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156. 
 59 Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics 
Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy Risks, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 154 (2017). 
 60 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156. 
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had invested in the company.61 Consequently, 23andMe was severely 
criticized, but defended itself by arguing it had informed the customers and 
participants all along in its Terms of Service and consent forms.62 Although 
23andMe’s actions were technically lawful, Barbara Prainsack pointed out 
that it was dishonest and immoral for the company to capitalize on the “free 
labour” and data capital of its customers, patients, and participants for profit 
under the grand name of research.63 In particular, Prainsack observed that 
23andMe’s business model was “continually evolving.”64 It was highly 
unlikely that participants could keep up with the frequent modifications to 
the Terms of Service and the fast-changing, constantly-updated terms in 
small print on the website.65 
These two incidents illustrate that there is a misalignment of 
orientations between citizen science participants and expert researchers. The 
former group was motivated by a genuine commitment to facilitate disease 
research, to contribute to health knowledge, and to create collective benefits. 
In contrast, the latter was motivated by profit and individual or corporate 
success. Yet, this mismatch might not be present at the research project’s 
outset. Rather, it is due to the fluid and flexible nature of health and medical 
research and citizen science that the projects soon spin out of control of 
citizen science participants and evolve beyond their own meanings. 
Additionally, expert researchers’ motivations can gradually grow apart 
from the motivations of their research subjects. The relation between expert 
researchers and participants is not on a traditional one-to-one model. Instead, 
it rests on an elaborate network backed by complex organizational structures 
and staffed by different experts at various levels. Citizen scientists or 
participants, motivated by altruism to share their personal data, can 
mistakenly think they can retain some form of control in a collaborative or 
cooperative manner.66 Their solidarity, sadly, is later exploited by researchers 
or commercial groups in both public and private spheres. 
Furthermore, if informed consent requires disclosure by researchers and 
comprehension by participants, then full disclosure of information will 
become neither definable nor achievable at the outset of the research due to 
the fast-changing nature of research. Writing on clinical treatment and 
research, Onora O’Neill has remarked on the inherent deficiency of informed 
 
 61 In fact, the founder of the company, Anne Wojcicki, was the wife of Google boss Sergey Brin at 
that time. Id. at 158; Seife, supra note 51. 
 62 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156. 
 63 Id. at 156–57. 
 64 Id. at 157. 
 65 Id. at 156–57. 
 66 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 52. 
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consent as a doctrine.67 She explains that this is not due to any procedural 
deficiencies ensuring that informed consent has been fulfilled, but rather that 
consent is a “propositional attitude.”68 It is a “description of a proposal” for 
treatment or research.69 One can only consent to the specific descriptions of 
a proposition but may not be aware of the foreseeable consequences. 
Does O’Neill’s conclusion mean that informed consent is no longer 
valid? Alternatively, does it suggest that it is high time for an urgent 
refinement of the requirement of consent? Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano 
Floridi have argued that the traditional framework on informed consent 
“does not cleanly transfer” to research involving biomedical big data.70 They 
point out this is because the doctrine of informed consent is formulated for 
single, specific research or treatment but not for the sharing, aggregating, or 
repurposing of data that may reveal unforeseen information.71 As a result, 
until we have found a satisfactory alternative model, the pressing concerns 
on obtaining informed consent for citizen science research in health data 
remain: deciding why the data are collected and how long the data will be 
kept, identifying who is permitted to have access to the data and who is 
processing the data for what purposes, and determining what to do in case 
the data are misused.72 
IV. RENEGOTIATING CONSENT 
To tackle the above, researchers in this area have formulated different 
models of informed consent. Here, we evaluate the common forms of open, 
broad, dynamic, portable, and meta consent. 
A. Open Consent 
In light of the inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of big data 
health research, some scholars have advocated for veracity or “radical 
honesty”73 in the model of “open consent,” which deliberately excludes any 
promises about privacy and requires participants to demonstrate 
 
 67 ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 42–43 (2002). 
 68 Id. at 43. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Brent D. Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Big Data: Current and Foreseeable Issues 
in Biomedical Contexts, 22 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 303, 311 (2016). 
 71 Id. at 312. 
 72 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 51–54. 
 73 JOHN T. WILBANKS, Portable Approaches to Informed Consent and Open Data, in PRIVACY, BIG 
DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 234, 234–35 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 
2014). 
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comprehension of the nature of the research and the risks involved prior to 
enrollment.74 
Open consent has been used in the famous Personal Genome Project 
(PGP) by Harvard University since 2005.75 The aim of the project is to test 
DNA sequencing technologies on human subjects by building a database of 
human genomes and traits, with the ambition to be a global network project.76 
The nature of the database is open source, open access, participatory, and 
collaborative. The target is to collect the genomes of 100,000 individuals and 
to make the information public with no serious effort at de-identification.77 
Since DNA is the ultimate digital identifier of an individual but de-
identification of samples would impoverish the data,78 the PGP research team 
has decided to be forthright and honest with the participants, aiming for them 
to be “truly informed” about the nature of the research.79 Participation of the 
public is encouraged and volunteers are asked to give open consent to ensure 
that they understand the scientific nature of the experiment and that they also 
understand that privacy and confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.80 
Misha Angrist, one of the original ten participants of the PGP back in 
2006, shared his experience and reflections.81 According to him, participants 
had to first go through an eligibility screening process which included filling 
out a questionnaire regarding family circumstances and privacy 
preferences.82 Second, they would review a study guide that covered the 
potential risks of participating.83 Third, they then took an “entrance exam” 
that covered the areas of how PGP worked, knowledge of genetics, ethical 
principles governing human subjects research, and their comfort level with 
having their genome and health records in the public domain.84 They had to 
score 100% on the exam before they could be enrolled in the project.85 
Finally, they had to sign a consent form, which stated the possibility of re-
 
 74 Madeleine P. Ball et al., Harvard Personal Genome Project: Lessons from Participatory Public 
Research, 6 GENOME MED. 10 (2014). Other examples of open consent model include the Omics project, 
The Human Microbiome Project, and the American Gut Project. See Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra 
note 5, at 14–16. 
 75 THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/ (last visited May 9, 2018). 
 76 At the time of writing, UK, Canada, and Austria have joined the network. Id. 
 77 Misha Angrist, Eyes Wide Open: The Personal Genome Project, Citizen Science and Veracity in 
Informed Consent, 6 PERSONALIZED MED. 691, 694 (2009). 
 78 Id. at 693. 
 79 Id. at 693–94. 
 80 Id. at 694–95. 
 81 Id. at 695. 
 82 Id. at 694. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 695. 
16:15 (2018) Moving Beyond Consent 
27 
identification, disclosure of non-paternity, and loss of insurance, as well as 
other risks of embarrassment, discrimination, data loss, or any unforeseen 
problems.86 
Participants were described as “co-drivers” of the project.87 They were 
expected to have solid knowledge about the field. Take Angrist as an 
example; he himself is a scientist who worked for an established institute for 
genome science and policy.88 He completed an early version of the entrance 
exam and suggested changes to certain questions, and questioned the 
rationale for specific analyses.89 He was also one of the three initial ten 
participants who served on the PGP Board of Directors.90 He was careful 
enough to carry out a certain test on his genotype and make sure the result 
was negative before deciding to make his cell line available to the public.91 
However, it is doubtful how many other citizen scientists or participants 
could achieve such thorough understanding of the research and its 
implications to privacy. 
B. Broad Consent 
Rather than asking participants to take a leap of faith into uncertainty, 
a slightly refined model of broad consent has been proposed. While one gives 
consent to a framework for future research of certain types, ethical review of 
each specific research project by an independent ethics committee is 
required.92 In addition, researchers must provide strategies on how to 
regularly update the participants and how to enable ongoing withdrawal 
opportunities for the participants.93 Examples of broad consent model 
research are the UK Biobank project and the Norwegian Mother Child 
Cohort Study.94 Nevertheless, regular updates to participants in ongoing 
research are seen as “extras” in this model.95 Thus, legal and ethical concerns 
have been raised as to whether broad consent is a form of genuine informed 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 693. 
 88 Id. at 691; see also FACULTY: MISHA ANGRIST, https://sanford.duke.edu/people/faculty/angrist-
misha (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 89 Angrist, supra note 77, at 693. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 695–96. 
 92 Kristin Solum Steinsbekk et al., Broad Consent Versus Dynamic Consent in Biobank Research: Is 
Passive Participation an Ethical Problem?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 897, 897–900 (2013). 
 93 Id. at 897. 
 94 Jane Kaye et al., Dynamic Consent: A Patient Interface for Twenty-first Century Research 
Networks, 23 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 142, 142 (2015). 
 95 Id. 
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consent when participants are reduced to passive subjects rather than 
research partners.96 
C. Dynamic Consent 
The alternative model of dynamic consent approaches consent from a 
unique perspective. It is a model tailor-made to the need of participants by 
utilizing an online interface and information technology-based platform. 
Information about the specific use of personal data and tissue as well as 
requests for consent for such use are put to the participants through the online 
platform.97 Participants are allowed to engage in an interactive personalized 
interface as much or as little as they choose and to alter their consent choices 
in real time.98 Consent is seen as a process, an ongoing interaction between 
researchers and participants. Hence, consent becomes dynamic because it 
allows participants to interact with the researchers over time, to consent to 
new projects, and to alter their consent choices in light of any new 
circumstances. This model was first designed for the EnCoRe project of three 
biobanks in Oxford from 2008 to 2012.99 Another example is the Registries 
for All (Reg4All) project run by Genetic Alliance in partnership with the 
technology company Private Access.100 Reg4All allows participants to 
decide how their data are being used and shared with particular researchers, 
institutions, or people studying a specific disease.101 Participants can track 
who has used their data and how.102 
Scholars praise the model of dynamic consent as providing a 
“personalised communication interface for interacting with patients, 
participants and citizens,”103 implementing engagement 2.0 in the era of Web 
2.0.104 Apparently, it enables consent to be given to multiple researchers and 
 
 96 Harriet JA Teare et al., Towards ‘Engagement 2.0’: Insights from a Study of Dynamic Consent 
with Biobank Participants, DIG. HEALTH 1, 2 (2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/2055207615605644. 
 97 Kaye et al., supra note 94, at 145. 
 98 Id. at 142. 
 99 Id. at 145; Marco C. Mont et al., EnCoRe: Dynamic Consent, Policy Enforcement and Accountable 
Information Sharing Within and Across Organisations, HEWLETT-PACKARD DEV. COMPANY, L.P. 1, 1–
4 (2012), http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2012/HPL-2012-36.pdf. 
 100 Debra J. H. Mathews & Leila Jamal, Revisiting Respect for Persons in Genomic Research, 5 
GENES 1, 7–8 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3978508/pdf/genes-05-
00001.pdf; Courtney Humphries, New Disease Registry Gives Patients Some Privacy, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/512456/new-disease-registry-gives-patients-
some-privacy. 
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 102 Id. 
 103 Kaye et al., supra note 94, at 141. 
 104 Teare et al., supra note 96, at 1. 
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projects, to open-ended and ongoing research, and to the use of secondary 
research or downstreaming of data use. Besides, dynamic consent overcomes 
the problem of locked-in consent confined to one experimental procedure for 
granting autonomy, choice, and control to individuals. At the same time, 
researchers can also manage the necessity to re-contact and to seek re-
consent from participants much more easily. 
Understandably, dynamic consent as a participant-centric initiative has 
its special appeal. Refining the model of dynamic consent, there are further 
variations on it. 
D. Portable Legal Consent (PLC) 
Another model is “portable legal consent” proposed by John Wilbanks 
of Sage Bionetworks.105 This model recognizes that individuals have rights 
with respect to the data generated from their bodies.106 They therefore will 
decide the kind of data that they would like to donate and share. For example, 
in the Sage Bionetworks, the suggested five categories of data are genetic 
sequence, clinical information, medical record, patient reported outcomes, 
and personal sensor data.107 Consent is not tied to any particular study but 
carried around by the participants like organ donation status.108 In that sense, 
consent becomes portable and controllable. Obtaining consent is done 
through an online interactive consent system.109 Participants can share their 
own data broadly in the public domain to serve scientific research regardless 
of the particular institution involved.110 In turn, the database of genomic 
information being collected through portable legal consent will be available 
to anyone who agrees to its terms.111 These include a guarantee not to use the 
data to harm anyone or to identify the participants.112 Users also agree to 
publish their work based on an open-access policy.113 
 
 105 WILBANKS, supra note 73, at 245. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 249. 
 108 Kuehn, supra note 8, at 679. 
 109 WILBANKS, supra note 73, at 246. 
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 111 Synapse Terms and Conditions of Use: Summary of Key Provisions, SAGE BIONETWORKS (Oct. 
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E. Meta Consent 
Rather than focusing on the distinct categories of personal data, the 
meta consent model allows participants to express a preference for how and 
when to provide consent at a meta level, i.e. how and when they would like 
to be presented with a request for consent to the use of their personal health 
data and biological material.114 In this model proposed by Ploug and Holm, 
participants must be provided with a predefined set of types of consent,115 
data,116 and research contexts to choose from.117 
While acknowledging similarities with dynamic consent, Ploug and 
Holm argue that meta consent is different in that dynamic consent was 
originally designed for biobanks.118 In contrast, meta consent is developed 
with the aim to handle and configure consent preferences for the entire 
population for all kinds of data and biological samples, with a vision that 
every citizen is a potential participant in big data research—especially in 
medical research.119 The meta consent model is designed “to provide a 
definitive answer by letting individuals design future consent requests on the 
basis of predefined types of consent, data, and contexts.”120 
V. LIMITATIONS OF CONSENT 
Regardless of which variation or refinement of consent one chooses, 
problems remain. Other than the fact that the nature of research and open 
consent require an advanced level of comprehension from citizen science 
participants, open consent is far from true consent. First, open consent does 
not allow participants to act meaningfully on their continuing interest in their 
own health data. It does not include recontact of subjects, the subject’s right 
to withdrawal, and the setting of time limits on the use of data.121 Further, it 
does not have restrictions on how information or materials are going to be 
 
 114 Thomas Ploug & Søren Holm, Meta Consent – A Flexible Solution to the Problem of Secondary 
Use of Health Data, 30 BIOETHICS 721, 724 (2016). 
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shared to third parties, which is a potential cause for concern especially if 
information is used later for commercial purpose.122 Besides, the way that it 
operates does not take prevention of harm, such as discrimination and other 
problems, into account. Altogether, so-called veracity has become an excuse 
to absolve researchers from accountability and responsibility. Although open 
consent may be legally valid, its practice remains ethically vague and 
questionable. 
In a similar vein, the alternative forms of consent are in essence 
information governance models, which are useful only for well-informed, 
engaged, and e-health literate participants.123 Concerns of digital divide and 
social exclusion have yet to be addressed in the dynamic consent model.124 
Participants will be asked for consent continuously because each new project 
requires fresh consent to be given. Arguably a person may potentially receive 
hundreds of consent requests each year.125 This is likely to cause routinization 
of consent behavior, resulting in people not reading the information and not 
reflecting on the choice, but simply choosing habitually to consent or refuse 
to consent.126 Although the refined model of meta consent allows opt-out or 
broad consent for future use of data, there is skepticism over whether meta 
consent is considered a form of valid informed consent under the new 
European Union regime of GDPR, which requires “explicit consent” for each 
and every data processing.127 The common thread that runs through the 
various models is that control has seemingly been passed to individual 
participants. Yet at the same time, responsibility has also shifted to them 
without ensuring that they have the required knowledge and competence to 
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make informed decisions.128 Steinsbekk et al. have even argued that based on 
the above point, broad consent may be better than dynamic consent, as at 
least independent review from a research ethics committee is required.129 
Overall, the above consent models may have enabled better 
participation of participants, but they remain largely information strategies. 
The mere passing of more information to participants, and the seeking of 
their indication at different stages of research, does not necessarily amount 
to building a democratic and participatory model of health and medical 
research. Steinsbekk et al. point out that the participation envisaged is limited 
as it is “participation inside an already established research arena where only 
minor changes of policy are up for discussion.”130 Furthermore, at best, we 
have filled only part of the knowledge gap (mentioned at the end of Part III 
of this article) in enabling participants to find out more about the purposes 
of data collection, the persons who have been accessing their data, and 
empowering those participants to have more control on how their data are 
being used down the stream of data reuse. The success of the remaining 
alternative models is highly dependent on how informed, competent, 
knowledgeable, and reflective the participants are. However, we have not 
addressed the nightmare scenario of what to do in case things go wrong. 
VI. BEYOND CONSENT: THE MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Indisputably, consent plays an important role in health and medical 
research, but mere information disclosure and seeking participants’ 
indication of choices do not necessarily guarantee the respect and self-
determination of individuals. At most, the above-suggested alternative 
consent frameworks have fulfilled the contractual ritual required by law.131 
They may have “managed” the legal concerns,132 but they have not resolved 
the problems of risks and harms not mentioned in the terms of agreement. 
Rather than shifting across different modes of consent and putting 
participants through a strenuous exercise of choices and forms, a consent 
model should be complemented with an accountability model. 
Big data technology has opened up undreamed-of capacities to gain a 
sophisticated understanding about the way we can process and use data to 
organize our society and our lives. Those insights, unfortunately, can be 
pitfalls at the same time. Governments in different jurisdictions are eager to 
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capture the benefits of big data but also to weed out its harms.133 In the present 
discussion, the medical sectors have used big data to monitor disease and 
assist in clinical decision-making. Yet the potential harms of big data 
technology should not be overlooked, especially when individuals’ personal 
lives are being affected significantly. When big data is used to define and 
construct identity—as in defining who a healthy citizen or employee is—
issues of privacy and personal data protection, discrimination and exclusion, 
as well as procedural fairness are inevitably involved.134 One common fear 
related to identification from health and medical data is insurance 
discrimination based on disease susceptibility.135 Another fear is group-level 
harm from analysis of aggregated data, including the risks of 
stigmatization.136 This is considered to be more problematic as all members 
of the community will be affected, not only those who have given consent 
for their data to be used. 
The risk and harm of stigmatization cannot be underestimated. For 
instance, it has been reported that a “warrior gene” is found to be prevalent 
in New Zealand Maori, which some scientists have suggested might explain 
why violence is common in the Maori community.137 This conclusion carries 
a potentially stigmatic effect beyond genetic research when one considers 
that police officers and jurors may be influenced by the finding.138 Similar 
claims that a particular population has a high level of a genetic variation 
associated with alcoholism, diabetes, or obesity could be stigmatic and lead 
to victim blaming.139 Anonymized data subjects may be grouped according 
to geographical, socio-economic, ethnic, or other characteristics.140 
Indigenous groups have raised concerns about the risk that they will be 
singled out for discrimination in big data health research.141 Furthermore, 
there is the concern of cultural harm which poses threats to the group in an 
unforeseen and unintended manner. For instance, data subjects give blood to 
researchers believing it is for diagnosis without realizing that researchers are 
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taking their human DNA and patenting its products.142 Yet, the practice of 
patenting a human gene sequence is deeply offensive and considered to be 
fundamentally immoral to certain native tribes.143 The above reveals some 
controversial legal and ethical issues of informed consent, group level harm, 
and the control of research uses and materials. 
Scholars have advocated for the incorporation of risk and harm 
assessment to tackle the problems of re-identification and discrimination in 
data privacy protection.144 Although they are writing in the larger context of 
cloud computing and big data technology, their proposed models on data-
driven accountability are equally applicable in our context of big data health 
research.145 
A. Risk Assessment of the Disclosure and Reuse of Data 
To ensure accountability, regulation of disclosure, and reuse of personal 
data, it is necessary to include de-identified data146 because third parties may 
identify the individuals concerned through data combination. This may lead 
to profiling, and the risks and adverse effects of profiling through data 
mining and data combination are well-recognized.147 Data brokers have been 
collecting, analyzing, selling, and linking individual identities without our 
knowledge for some time.148 For example, Acxiom, the largest data broker in 
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the U.S. and a marketing giant, holds an average of 1,500 pieces of 
information on each of more than 200 million Americans.149 Also, it is 
estimated that each piece of information that users post on Facebook is worth 
five cents and that each Facebook user is worth $100 as a source of 
information.150 Presently, there is limited regulation of the secondary use of 
data in most jurisdictions, particularly when they take the ostensible form of 
de-identified, nonpersonal data.151 Ultimately, this is an issue of data security, 
relating to the obligations of data controllers to protect against unauthorized 
data access, use, and disclosure by third parties. 
I am not advocating for a complete ban on the use of de-identified data. 
Indeed, there are legitimate reasons to reuse de-identified (pseudonymous) 
data,152 such as in pharmaceutical trials and medical data research or for other 
legitimate purposes that serve the public interest. In such cases, scholars have 
recommended that clear guidelines be set, with minimum standards 
established for the de-identification of datasets and independent reviews of 
the risk of re-identification before data disclosure.153 Many have advocated 
that a specific model be used to measure the continuum of risk involved. For 
example, Hon et al. use the “realistic risk of identification” as a benchmark,154 
whereas Schwartz and Solove suggest the “substantial risk of 
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Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1882 (2011). 
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assessment should take account of (1) the data-handling techniques used by 
database owners, (2) the nature of information release, with the public 
disclosure of data being subject to stricter scrutiny, (3) the quantity of data 
involved, (4) the likely motives and economic incentives for anyone to re-
identify the data, and (5) the trust culture in a particular industry or sector—
that is, the existing standard of fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality in 
that sector.156 Furthermore, as data identification and combination 
technologies are advancing at a rapid pace, I contend that any risk assessment 
concerned should be carried out on a regular basis with citizen scientists, 
rather than only at the stages of data collection and de-identification and 
disclosure. 
B. Re-identification: Data Quality and Size 
When considering threats of re-identification external to the original 
research team or organizations, data quality and size also need to be taken 
into account. Data quality refers to the nature, sensitivity, and linkability of 
data to individuals.157 Linkability refers to the different degrees of data 
identifiability or the levels of effort required to identify an individual.158 An 
example of good quality data is the information presented in Google Flu 
Trends. Regardless of whether its predictions are accurate,159 the information 
that Google gathers from the online web search queries submitted by 
millions of individuals is abstracted at a high level and safely aggregated.160 
Another important element of data quality is data size. The size of a 
database is determinative of how easy it is to link the information therein to 
an individual. The larger the database, the easier that link is to make.161 
However, the law seems to be silent regarding data controllers and how much 
data they may collect, how long they may retain data, and whether stricter 
security measures are needed for large databases.162 Ohm argues that new 
quantitative limits and guidelines should be enacted to address these 
 
 156 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1765–68 (2010). 
 157 Id. at 1766. 
 158 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Technique, 
WP216, at 11 (Apr. 10, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf (“Linkability, which is the ability to link, at least, two records 
concerning the same data subject or a group of data subjects (either in the same database or in two 
different databases).”). 
 159 Charles Arthur, Google Flu Trends Is No Longer Good at Predicting Flu, Scientists Find, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/27/google-
flu-trends-predicting-flu. 
 160 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 155, at 1882. 
 161 Ohm, supra note 156, at 1766–67. 
 162 Id. 
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issues.163 Such limits and guidelines would undoubtedly have an impact on 
bio-banks given the vast quantity of data stored in them, but they are still 
certainly deserving of further consideration. 
In sum, in determining the likelihood of re-identification, we must also 
consider the quality and quantity of the data in question. Ultimately, the core 
issue in personal data protection is identity protection. 
C. Sensitive Data and Recombination of Data 
Many of the foregoing measures are dependent on the compliance 
framework of the data controllers and the organizations or companies 
concerned. Participants often have no idea that their data are being reused 
and processed or that they have been re-identified. It is therefore important 
to formulate an alternative privacy framework that is based less on consent 
and more on holding data controllers accountable for the particular reuse of 
data based on risk and the likely adverse impact on data subjects when the 
unauthorized disclosure takes place. Namely, the European Union has a 
higher standard for the use of sensitive personal data, which includes genetic, 
biometric, and health data under the new GDPR, while the U.S. regulates the 
combination of data. 
The EU affords sensitive personal data special protection. Article 9 of 
the GDPR requires explicit consent from data subjects before any processing 
of sensitive data.164 In addition, recital 51 of the GDPR specifies that personal 
data “which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in relation to 
fundamental rights and freedoms merit specific protection as the context of 
their processing could create significant risks to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms.”165 Examples of such include personal data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin. Although the categories of sensitive data are likely to be 
controversial in different contexts and cultures, the “sensitive” nature of 
certain data reveals the underlying values and harm concerned. For example, 
data related to an individual’s health (particularly sensitive health 
information such as HIV status) may lead to discrimination against that 
individual.166 Bearing in mind the threat of harm arising from the re-
 
 163 Id. at 1767. 
 164 Article 9 of the EU GDPR prohibits the processing of personal data revealing “racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade-union membership, and the 
processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purposes of uniquely identifying a natural person, data 
concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation,” unless data subjects 
provide their explicit consent or other conditions under article 9(2) are satisfied. GDPR, supra note 35, 
at art. 9. 
 165 GDPR, supra note 35. 
 166 It was recently reported that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been “collecting 
racial and ethnic information and ‘mapping’ American communities around the country based on crude 
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identification of certain data, here I would argue that organizations need to 
ensure that sensitive data, which may perhaps be better described as critical 
data, are stored separately from the general network. They also need to 
ensure that access to such data is carefully monitored and that combination 
with other data cannot easily take place. Public disclosure must be 
impossible.167 
Rather than imposing a high standard on a discrete category of sensitive 
data, there is special restriction on the combination of data in the U.S. For 
instance, in 2013, California amended its law on personal information to 
include regulation of the practice of data combination by imposing new 
requirements on the operators of commercial websites or online services that 
collect the personal information of Californian consumers.168 The relevant 
provisions were further amended in 2016.169 Under the amended section 
1798.29 of the California Civil Code, the definition of personal information 
has been expanded to include “[a]n individual’s first name or first initial and 
last name in combination with any one or more” of five stated categories of 
data fields (if any is unencrypted): (1) social security number, (2) driver’s 
licence number or California identification card number, (3) bank account 
number or credit or debit card number in combination with any required 
“security code, access code, or password” that would permit access to an 
individual’s financial records, (4) medical information, (5) health insurance 
information, and (6) “information or data collected through the use or 
operation of an automated license plate recognition system.”170 The 
definition also now includes “a user name or email address, in combination 
with a password or security question and answer that would permit access to 
an online account.”171 All of this information is subject to a specific duty of 
notice of breach and security requirement.172 California’s approach to 
regulating the combination of certain categories of unencrypted information 
constitutes a move in the right direction. 
 
stereotypes about which groups commit different types of crimes.” Seeta Peña Gangadharan & Sean 
Vitka, Knowing Is Half the Battle: Combating Big Data’s Dark Side Through Data Literacy, SLATE (Apr. 
2, 2014, 10:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/04/02/white_house_big_data_and_
privacy_review_we_need_federal_policy_about_digital.html [https://perma.cc/6BS6-65QN]. 
 167 See Ohm, supra note 156, at 1768. 
 168 S. 46, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
 169 Assemb. 2828, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 170 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(g)(1) (West 2017). An “[a]utomated license plate recognition system” 
is defined under section 1798.90.5 of the California Civil Code to mean a “searchable computerized 
database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer 
algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-
readable data.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90.5 (West 2016). 
 171 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(g)(2) (West 2017). 
 172 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2017). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2017). 
16:15 (2018) Moving Beyond Consent 
39 
The emphasis is rightly on data being unattributable to a specific data 
subject without the use of additional information, as long as such additional 
information is kept separately and subject to technical and organizational 
measures to ensure anonymity.173 In addition, the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has recommended a more robust system of de-
identification and accountability.174 Rather than toiling with various concepts 
of de-identified data (anonymous, anonymized, and pseudonymous data), the 
FTC acknowledges that the de-identification of data is not foolproof, and 
thus there is always a possibility that individuals will be re-identified.175 
Accordingly, it recommends that companies should adopt a three-prong 
approach: (1) robustly de-identify personal data; (2) publicly make a 
commitment not to re-identify data, and (3) contractually require the same 
public commitment from any downstream users with which they share data 
with.176 Such requirements should extend to the sharing of data with third-
parties owing to the possibility of subsequent attribution by later parties.177 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Big data and information communication technologies hold great 
promise for health and medical citizen science. Citizen scientists can connect 
and exchange data with one another and with researchers. This has led to 
growing expectations to access and reuse the data in bio-banks and 
repositories. In grappling with the shifting nature of data and ever-evolving 
technology, various notions of consent have been formulated to resolve the 
tension between researchers’ need for data and subjects’ will for privacy and 
self-determination. Yet all the attempts to refine and redefine consent have 
proved to be futile conquests to preserve an individual’s full autonomy. 
Embedded in big data analytics is the use of both data and personal data 
and the matching of data sets. Arguably, one does not have enough data and 
medical science literacy to give meaningful consent to research involving 
such technology. To most participants, their consent may have reiterated 
their dependency on expert researchers, medical professionals, or state 
authorities. Regardless whether it is open or dynamic or a variation in-
between, consent only gives an illusion of control in the big data age. Despite 
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the fact that the formulations of consent may be compatible with existing 
legal standards, they may be a far cry from ethical imperatives such as 
personal dignity, equality, and democratic accountability. The layered 
meanings of consent often come with a broader shift of unsolicited 
responsibility from public healthcare authorities, commercial actors, or 
institutional researchers to individual participants.178 Regulators have warned 
that the transfer of risk and regulation should not “signal a reduction in the 
standards and quality of healthcare provision.”179 What lies behind the 
seeming empowerment of citizens should not be a disguised exploitation or 
extraction and sale of personal data leading to discrimination against 
individuals or groups. 
While consent is still essential in medical and health research, it must 
be assured by a complementary system of data-driven accountability. 
Consent alone is not enough to restore autonomy to individual and citizen 
scientists in fast-evolving, data-intensive research. As there are different 
dimensions and forms of citizen science, so should the participation of 
citizen scientists at various stages of research follow the life cycle of data 
usage including risk and harm assessment, re-identification, and 
combination of data. The solution to attain autonomy must come through a 
comprehensive set of citizen science practice involving data research. 
 
 178 Eline M. Bunnik et al., A Tiered-Layered-Staged Model for Informed Consent in Personal 
Genome Testing, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 596, 598 (2013). The layered meanings of consent refer to 
the different layers or levels of information that is required. Id. at 598. The first basic level is directed at 
fundamental information essential for informed consent, which is explicitly offered to data subjects and 
is often kept minimal to enable easy communication. Id. The second or further layers of consent is based 
on extendable information, accessible for data subjects who actively seek for it or who have signed up 
for ongoing research, re-contact, or extras in the models of dynamic consent, portable legal consent, or 
meta consent. Id. 
 179 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 62. 
